

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ROME 16787

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IT

SUBJECT: POLITICAL PROGRAM OF MORO GOVERNMENT

SUMMARY AND COMMENT: MORO'S SPEECH WAS NOTABLE FOR ITS FRANK
RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY. IT WAS
ELOQUENT IN ITS APPEAL FOR POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT.
THE UNUSUAL VIGOR OF MORO'S PRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT WAS
HELPFUL IN COUNTERACTING WIDESPREAD RUMORS CONCERNING HIS HEALTH.

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ON THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SIDE, THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIVE SHIFT

FROM THE PROGRAM OUTLINED EARLIER BY DC PARTY SECRETARY FANFANI. ALTHOUGH CONCILIATORY NUANCES WERE INTRODUCED WITH RESPECT TO GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST OPPOSITION AND THE UNIONS, THE CLEAR SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT MAJORITY AND COMMUNIST OPPOSITION WAS REITERATED. ALL THE RIGHT THINGS WERE SAID IN THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF HIS SPEECH REGARDING ITALY'S FIDELITY TO EUROPEAN UNITY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. GREAT ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO ITALIAN RELATIONS WITH THE "THIRD WORLD" PARTICULARLY THE MIDEAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE SPEECH WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO ELICIT A MAXIMUM OF PARLIAMENTARY AND POPULAR SUPPORT FOR A MINORITY GOVERNMENT FACED WITH GRAVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES AND SPECULATION AT THE OUTSET REGARDING ITS PROBABLE LIFE SPAN. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

1. OPENING PORTION OF MORO PROGRAM SPEECH EXPLAINED GENESIS OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT (DC) - REPUBLICAN (PRI) COALITION AND EMPHASIZED THAT GOVERNMENT WILL FOLLOW A CENTER-LEFT POLICY AIMED AT PERMITTING RECONSTITUTION OF "ORGANIC" CENTER-LEFT COALITION AT A LATER DATE. MORO'S REFERENCES TO THE SOCIALISTS AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WERE INCLUDED IN HIS DEFENSE OF THE "LITTLE COALITION" HE HEADS. HE ATTRIBUTED FANFANI'S AND HIS OWN FAILURE TO RE-ESTABLISH THE FOUR PARTY CENTER-LEFT COALITION TO "THE TENSION EXISTING BETWEEN THE TWO SOCIALIST PARTIES" THE MERITS OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PRESUME TO JUDGE. IN DEFENDING THE DC'S REFUSAL TO CHOOSE BETWEEN THEM, HE PROBABLY DISPLEASED BOTH PARTIES. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO MORO, THE DC WOULD HAVE FAILED IN ITS DUTY HAD IT LEFT THE PSDI, A FORCE IMPORTANT TO PROGRESS AND STABILITY, "TO LANGUISH IN STAGNANT POLITICS, MODERATE OR CONSERVATIVE." ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A SHAMEFUL AND REGRETTABLE ACT TO ALLOW THE SOCIALISTS TO SLIP FROM THE AREA OF GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTER-LEFT WHERE THIS "FRONTIER PARTY" WITH ITS TIES TO THE WORKING CLASS COOPERATES IN PROGRESS, REJECTING "THE SIREN CALL OF MAXIMALISM."

2. MORO WAS LAVISH IN HIS PRAISE OF LA MALFA AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY FOR HAVING MADE POSSIBLE A SOLUTION HE DEFINED AS MUCH MORE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE POLITICS OF THE CENTER-LEFT. HE ATTRIBUTED TO THE REPUBLICAN PARTICIPATION AN IMPORTANCE FAR IN EXCESS OF THE PARTY'S NUMBERS, SINCE IT REPRESENTED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CATHOLIC AND LAY FORCES OF ITALY. HE ADDED THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SMALL REPUBLICAN PARTY IN THE GOVERNMENT GIVES A FIRM GUARANTEE TO LAY PUBLIC OPINION DURING A PERIOD WHEN THE GOVERNMENT WILL

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PRESS FOR REVISION OF THE 1929 CONCORDAT WITH THE VATICAN.

3. ALTHOUGH MORO EXPRESSED REGRET THAT FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER TAVIANI CHOSE NOT TO ENTER THE GOVERNMENT (I.E., THAT HE REFUSED TO ACCEPT A SWITCH FROM INTERIOR TO A DIFFERENT MINISTRY), HE IMPLICITLY CRITICIZED THE FAILURE OF THE POLICE, IN TAVIANI'S FORMER MINISTRY, TO IDENTIFY TERRORISTS RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE. HE ALSO REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE THESIS (EXPRESSED

BY TAVIANI) THAT POLITICAL TERRORISM COMES VIRTUALLY EXCLUSIVELY FROM THE RIGHT AND WARNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT REMAIN "INERT" IN THE FACE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE FROM OTHER SOURCES AND THE RISING WAVE OF COMMON CRIMINALITY.

4. MORO STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL FOLLOW A POLICY OF CLEAR OPPOSITION TO THE FAR RIGHT (I.E., THE NEO-FASCIST MSI PARTY). HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS OF THE SMALL RIGHT-OF-CENTER LIBERAL PARTY (PLI) AND PROMISED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL GIVE ATTENTIVE EXAMINATION TO PLI PROPOSALS AND CRITICISMS. HOWEVER, HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE POLITICAL SITUATION RENDERS IMPROBABLE ANY MOVE TO BRING THE PLI INTO THE MAJORITY. (NOTE: THE OPPOSITION LIBERAL PARTY IS EXPECTED TO MAKE A GOODWILL GESTURE TOWARDS THE MORO GOVERNMENT BY ABSTAINING ON THE PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF CONFIDENCE ON THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM.)

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5. IN HIS DETAILED AND CAREFULLY BALANCED COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST (PCI) OPPOSITION, MORO DID NOT DEVIATE SUBSTANTIVELY FROM THE OFT EXPRESSED CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT POLICY OF MAINTAINING A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MAJORITY AND OPPOSITION. MORO TERMED PCI-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AS BEING "POLEMIC OR DIALECTIC" IN NATURE AND FIRMLY REJECTED THE "SO-CALLED HISTORIC COMPROMISE" AS AN UNNATURAL BRINGING TOGETHER OF THE COMMUNISTS WITH THE PARTIES IN POWER. "THE EXISTENCE OF THIS GOVERNMENT", MORO DECLARED, "SIGNIFIES THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT THIS PROSPECT." DESPITE HIS FIRM
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STANCE AGAINST PCI ENTRY INTO THE GOVERNING MAJORITY, HOWEVER, MORO REITERATED HIS LONG ADVOCATED POLICY OF "ATTENTION" TOWARDS THE COMMUNISTS, COMPLIMENTED THEIR "DISTINGUISHED" PERFORMANCE IN THEIR OPPOSITION ROLE AND STATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ATTENTIVELY CONSIDER COMMUNIST SUGGESTIONS ON NATIONAL POLICY ISSUES. THE TONE OF MORO'S REMARKS ON THE PCI, IF NOT THE SUBSTANCE WAS NOTABLY MORE CONCILIATORY THAN THAT USED BY DC PARTY SECRETARY FANFANI IN HIS PAST SPEECHES ON THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE ISSUE.

6. WITH THE UNIONS, MORO PROMISED TO OPEN A JOINT EXAMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS TO RELIEVE UNEMPLOYMENT RESULTING FROM THE DROP IN INVESTMENTS; DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNIONS WOULD BE ENTRUSTED TO AN (UNNAMED) "PARTICULARLY QUALIFIED GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY" WHICH WOULD RELATE THE EFFECTS OF THE VARIOUS ECONOMIC MEASURES TO THE TOTAL

PICTURE. MORO'S TREATMENT OF THE THORNY SUBJECT OF GOVERNMENT-UNION RELATIONS WAS CONCILIATORY, BUT HE INDICATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT INTENDED TO STAND FIRM ON ITS "INSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES" AND NOT ALLOW UNION DEMANDS TO DEFEAT THE ECONOMIC PROGRAM.

7. IN ADDITION TO THE ECONOMIC MEASURES OUTLINED TO FIGHT INFLATION AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT, MORO PROMISED TO PRESS FORWARD WITH VARIOUS LONG-PENDING SOCIAL REFORMS. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS WAS GIVEN TO MEASURES REQUIRING MORE POLITICAL DECISIVENESS THAN MONEY SUCH

AS: STIMULATING A GREATER DEGREE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REGIONS, REFORM OF THE FAMILY LAW, OF THE PENAL CODE AND OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEM.

8. MORO STATED THAT THE "EUROPEAN CHOICE," THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, AND THE PROCESS OF DETENTE WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CORNER STONES OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, AND DEFINED THE FIRST TWO AS ITALY'S

FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE OF SECURITY. ITALY'S SOLID TIE WITH EUROPE COMPLETES, RATHER THAN CONTRADICTS, ITS FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY WITH THE US. THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO THE US SERVED THE LATTER PURPOSE, AND DID NOT HAVE "DIRECT OR INDIRECT NEGOTIATIONS" AS ITS OBJECT OR CONTENT. HE EXPRESSED UNHAPPINESS WITH THE RESULTS SO FAR ATTAINED IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, "CONFIRMED" ITALY'S ADHERENCE TO NPT, BUT SAID NOTHING ABOUT WHEN RATIFICATION WOULD BE COMPLETED. HE EXPRESSED ACCEPTANCE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S PROPOSALS ON PETROLUM NEGOTIATIONS, ON CONDITION THAT THEY DO NOT LEAD

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TO A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN CONSUMING AND PRODUCING COUNTRIES. TOGETHER WITH MORO'S REAFFIRMATION OF TRADITIONAL ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, A DETERMINATION TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE UN IN COOPERATION WITH THESE COUNTRIES, AND DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN SITUATION. HE ASSERTED THAT ITALY MAINTAINS "ITS BEST AND MOST FERTILE RELATIONS" WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND DEVOTED THE ENTIRE FIRST HALF OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT TO THESE AREAS AND THE UN.

9. IN CLOSING, MORO, WITH FERVOR, ELOQUENCE, AND DIRECTNESS PROTRAYED THE PROFOUND ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS GRIPPING THE COUNTRY. "UNCERTAINTY, CONFUSION, DISORDER (AND) INERTIA," HE SAID, GIVE THE PUBLIC THE IMPRESSION OF A SYSTEM IMPOTENT IN DEALING WITH THE DIFFICULTIES BEFORE IT. PERHAPS THE UNIONS, AND CERTAINLY THE GOVERNMENT, PARTIES AND PARLIAMENT APPEAR TO BE INCAPABLE OF EFFICIENTLY RESOLVING PRESENT PROBLEMS, AND MAKE THE CITIZENRY FEEL ABANDONED AND DISSATISFIED. AFTER EXPRESSING FAITH IN THE ITALIAN PEOPLE TO OVERCOME AND PERHAPS INFLUENCED BY RECENT STATEMENTS BY WILLY BRANDT, MORO STATED CRYPTICALLY THAT EVEN THE "MOST SEVERE FOREIGN OBSERVERS," WHO SEE ITALY PUSHED ONTO THE SIDELINES BY PRESENT DIFFICULTIES, HESITATE TO ABANDON US BECAUSE OF ITALY'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION AND EUROPEAN AND MEDITERRANEAN ROLE. ITALY'S RUIN, HE ADDED, WOULD INVOLVE MANY WHO NOW FEEL THEMSELVES SECURE. MORO CONCLUDED WITH A PLEA TO HIS COUNTRYMEN FOR ATLEAST CONDITIONAL FAITH AND SUPPORT AND ASKED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT BE JUDGED BY ITS FIRM AND WILL TO BRING ITALY TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND CIVIL LIBERTY.

10. THE SENATE TODAY BEGAN DEBATE ON THE MORO PROGRAM AND IS EXPECTED TO GIVE THE NEW GOVERNMENT A VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BY DECEMBER 5. THE DEBATE WILL THEN SHIFT TO THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND THE FINAL VOTE OF CONFIDENCE IS EXPECTED BY THE WEEKEND OR, AT THE LATEST, EARLY NEXT WEEK. THE TWO-PARTY MORO GOVERNMENT EXPECTS AN AMPLE PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY BASED ON THE SUPPORT OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, REPUBLICANS, SOCIALISTS, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE SMALL, ETHNIC SOUTH TIROL PEOPLES PARTY.

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